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The Presidency, Congressional 
Republicans, and the Future  
of Financial Reform
Peter Conti-Brown, JD
As the curtain falls on the Obama presidency, historians have already begun  
to put the past Administration into a broader context.
While only the Affordable Care Act will be identi-
fied by the former President’s name—even Obama has 
embraced the Obamacare moniker—the Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, or 
Dodd-Frank, will figure prominently in any assess-
ment of Obama’s legacy. 
As with its older sibling, how Dodd-Frank is 
assessed will be a partial function of how much of 
it survives. Since before its enactment in July 2010, 
Republicans have been circling wagons to amend it, 
gut it, or repeal it. Now that the party has assumed 
control of both houses of Congress and the White 
House, some skeptics are ready to forecast the disman-
tling of Dodd-Frank. For support, they point to the 
Financial CHOICE Act, a piece of legislation intro-
duced by Republicans in September 2016.1 
Not so fast. While the CHOICE Act would 
certainly amount to a wholesale repudiation and near 
complete repeal of Dodd-Frank’s key provisions, a dif-
ficult political dynamic is underway that the election 
of Donald Trump complicates, rather than facilitates. 
At play is both an ideological difference in how the 
government should approach financial reform, but also 
institutional differences that have more to do with 
presidential politics than partisan ideology. 
SUMMARY
• When it comes to financial regulation, many have assumed 
that the Trump Administration will now work in concert with a 
Republican-controlled Congress to repeal Dodd-Frank in full—
a move anticipated in the CHOICE Act, a piece of legislation 
introduced by Republicans in September 2016. But there are 
reasons to believe that this will not be so straightforward.
• Republicans fashioned the CHOICE Act in anticipation of a 
Hillary Clinton presidency, with the goal of limiting the execu-
tive’s discretion in response to financial risk. In light of Donald 
Trump’s unexpected rise to the Presidency, it is possible that 
some Republicans may start reevaluating the benefits of limiting 
executive authority. And recent comments by President Trump’s 
pick for Treasury Secretary, Steven Mnuchin, suggest that the 
Administration favors keeping some aspects of Dodd-Frank.
• This issue brief examines the tension between the Republican 
ideological commitment to curbing executive power and the 
opportunity Republicans now have for Trump to dominate the 
direction of financial regulatory reform. The discussion will 
focus on three key policy outcomes that Republicans have 
sought during the last six years: reforming the Federal Re-
serve, overhauling the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
and changing the way in which the nation’s largest financial 
institutions are designated and regulated.
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In this Issue Brief, I will discuss 
those two sometimes conflicting moti-
vations behind Republican reform 
of the financial sector and focus 
especially on three key policy out-
comes that Republicans have sought 
during the last six years: reforming 
the Federal Reserve, overhauling 
the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau, and changing the way 
the largest financial institutions are 
regulated. The issues described here 
are much broader than the CHOICE 
Act, though that proposed legislation 
provides a useful jumping off point 
for discussion. The real questions are 
about who controls power within the 
party system: those with ideological 
commitments to specific policy out-
comes, or those who seek to increase 
the institutional power of the Presi-
dent. Prior to last November, Republi-
can calls for financial reform had been 
predicated on a Hillary Clinton presi-
dency. Now that that has not come to 
pass, and Republicans control both 
the executive and legislative branches, 
this Issue Brief reviews a new set of 
questions that have arisen as to how 
the ruling party will pursue its agenda 
with respect to financial regulation. 
THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS 
OF FINANCIAL REFORM 
It is inaccurate to refer to “Dodd-
Frank” as a single law. It is, in fact, 
sixteen different statutes rolled into 
one. But when Dodd-Frank’s crit-
ics point to an overarching zeitgeist, 
it is essentially technocratic: the Act 
puts enormous power in the hands of 
regulators—whether at the Federal 
Reserve or FDIC, or new agencies like 
the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau and the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council—to prevent, man-
age, and resolve abuses of the financial 
system that can result in crisis. 
The Republican model for reform 
is very different. Rather than del-
egating to regulators this power, 
the Republican model would place 
more control in the hands of market 
participants themselves and, failing 
that, judges. The defenders of the 
Republican plan for financial reform 
would emphasize a light governmental 
touch and the rule of law. Let market 
participants allocate risk as makes 
most sense to their business model 
and let them fail when they cannot. 
That failure will be resolved by law-
following bankruptcy judges after the 
fact, not fine-tuning central bankers 
well before. 
The CHOICE Act reflects those 
twin pillars. The surprise election of 
Donald Trump suggests to many, 
including the CHOICE Act’s spon-
sors in Congress, that this Republican 
approach to governance and regula-
tion will finally get its due. But there 
is a problem with this assumption. The 
CHOICE Act is a staging ground not 
only for ideological conflict between 
technocratic Democrats and market-
oriented Republicans, but also for 
an institutional conflict between the 
executive and Congress. The bill was 
introduced with the presumption that 
Hillary Clinton would win the presi-
dential election. Much of the language 
aimed at limiting the powers of the 
executive can be read through that 
prism. But what does the direction of 
financial reform under an ostensibly 
unified Republican federal govern-
ment look like? And what happens if 
the new Republican President disap-
proves of some of his party’s estab-
lished views on the 2010 law? 
These are the questions for those 
who would predict a wholesale aban-
donment of Dodd-Frank. While we 
cannot be sure of the final shape of 
a financial reform under a govern-
ment united by the Republican Party, 
we can be certain that the policy 
and institutional preferences of the 
 1  For a summary of the CHOICE Act’s key features, see 
http://nascus.org/publications/NASCUSReport/2016/
CHOICE%20summary.pdf.
 2  Jesse Hamilton, “Mnuchin Puts Pressure on Banks Over 
Volcker Rule, Glass-Steagall,” Bloomberg, January 19, 
2017. 
 3  Peter Conti-Brown, The Power and Independence of the 
Federal Reserve, Princeton University Press, 2016; Rand 
Paul and Mark Spitznagel, “The Fed is Crippling America,” 
TIME, January 10, 2016 ; Binyamin Appelbaum and Brady 
Dennis, “Legislation by Senator Dodd would overhaul 
banking regulators,” Washington Post, November 11, 
2009.
 4  Victoria McGrane, “Elizabeth Warren and David Vitter 
Introduce Fed Legislation,” Wall Street Journal, May 
7, 2015. Warren (D-MA) and Vitter (R-LA) have jointly 
criticized the Fed’s lack of transparency and introduced 
a bill to distribute authority and responsibility more evenly 
among Fed governors.
 5  For example, see Janet Yellen’s November 16, 2015 letter 
to House Speaker Paul Ryan and Minority Leader Nancy 
Pelosi available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/foia/
files/ryan-pelosi-letter-20151116.pdf.
 6  See the transcript of the Meeting of the Federal Open 
Market Committee, November 1-2, 2011 available at 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/
FOMC20111102meeting.pdf.
 7  From the opening lines of a speech delivered by Ben 
Bernanke on November 14, 2007: “Montagu Norman, the 
Governor of the Bank of England from 1921 to 1944, re-
putedly took as his personal motto, “Never explain, never 
excuse.”   Norman’s aphorism exemplified how he and 
many of his contemporaries viewed the making of mon-
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Republican President will change that 
ethos. For example, President Trump’s 
nominee for Treasury Secretary, Steve 
Mnuchin, has already walked back the 
idea of doing away with Dodd-Frank 
in its entirety. During his Senate 
confirmation hearing, Mnuchin said 
that the new administration favors the 
Volcker Rule, which prevents com-
mercial banks from using depository 
assets for making investments not on 
behalf of a client. As Mnuchin stated, 
“The concept of proprietary trading 
does not belong in banks with FDIC 
insurance.”2 This declaration should 
surprise some of Obama’s and Dodd-
Frank’s longest-standing Republican 
critics: repeal of the Volcker Rule has 
long been a goal of those critics.
Whatever the ultimate direc-
tion that these legislative and execu-
tive debates take, three major points 
will be central to any discussion of 
financial reform. These three areas 
of potential reform are: the Federal 
Reserve’s operations, particularly as 
they pertain to how the Fed con-
ducts monetary policy; the role of 
the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau; and the process of designating 
and regulating large financial institu-
tions as “systemically important” and 
thus subject to additional regulatory 
constraints. The remainder of this 
Issue Brief highlights and addresses 
the critical aspects of each of these 
three areas, with the acknowledgment 
that other important issues remain 
outstanding, such as the complexities 
of the Volcker Rule and the massive 
growth of the shadow banking system.
REMODELING THE ROLE OF 
THE FED
Politicians, activists, academics, and 
central banks have discussed many 
ways to alter the status quo of the 
Fed’s independent monetary policy 
authority and financial industry 
supervision over the past few years.3 
In response to the Fed’s outsized role 
in combatting the ill effects of the 
financial crisis, there has been a call 
for greater transparency and account-
ability of the Bank’s activities. While 
the Fed has been subject to a variety 
of critiques for the way it has handled 
the response to financial crises and 
bank supervision generally, the main 
focus—and certainly the place where 
the Fed is likely to fight back the 
hardest4—is in the specific ways that 
it conducts monetary policy. 
Republicans have long criticized 
the Fed for using discretion in con-
ducting monetary policy, rather than 
following a rigid, programmatic rule. 
Legislative proposals, including within 
the CHOICE Act but also predating 
it, would insert much more congres-
sional engagement with monetary 
policy through more transparent 
rulemaking. House Republicans have 
called for the Fed’s monetary policy 
committee, the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC), to explain all 
of their policy rate decisions in terms 
of a standardized rule and to do so, 
specifically to Congress, within days 
of each FOMC meeting. Critics of 
this proposal have wrongly asserted 
that this rule necessarily must be the 
Taylor Rule, named for the simple 
arithmetic function first devised by 
Stanford economist John Taylor to 
describe how the Fed conducted 
monetary policy from 1987-1992. The 
original proposals do indeed mandate 
that conformity, but the current leg-
islative plan would require the Fed to 
choose its own rule and explain why 
it deviates from the Taylor Rule, if in 
fact it does.
The Fed has argued—persuasively, 
in my view—against this proposal.5 
Guiding monetary policymaking 
by a coherent and consistent rule is 
not necessarily disadvantageous. The 
Fed has embraced this method for 
decision-making, as the recent disclo-
sures in the 2011 FOMC transcripts 
etary policy--as an arcane and esoteric art, best practiced 
out of public view.” Available at https://www.federalre-
serve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20071114a.htm.
 8  J. Lawrence Broz, “The Federal Reserve’s Coalition in 
Congress,” Working Paper, February 2015.
 9  See the Federal Reserve System Audited Annual Financial 
Statements available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/bst_fedfinancials.htm#audited.
 10  The CHOICE Act goes further by mandating a retrospective 
review of all regulations every five years against a pre-
determined set of metrics for the purpose of determining 
regulatory efficacy. This requirement would apply across 
the board to every financial regulatory agency.
 11  The current proposal does not abolish the FSOC outright, 
but rather repurposes the entity as an inter-agency forum 
on financial stability with a mission that is largely relegat-
ed to market monitoring and information sharing. In that 
sense, it mirrors the pre-Dodd-Frank Presidential Working 
Group on Financial Markets, created by Ronald Reagan in 
1988. 
NOTES 
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suggest.6 And the idea that the Fed 
should not be a fortress of techni-
cal solitude is a sound one. We are a 
long way off from the central banking 
ethos that dominated the 19th and 
20th centuries to “never explain, never 
excuse,” in the words of one promi-
nent central banker.7 
Indeed, the Fed is today one of the 
most transparent of all governmental 
institutions. It holds regular press con-
ferences; its key leaders give speeches 
and congressional testimony. Its min-
utes are released after three weeks, and 
full transcripts released on a five-year 
lag. Mandating monetary policymak-
ing by rule will enhance transparency 
in some ways, but it won’t add trans-
parency where none exists. 
Perhaps more importantly, trans-
parency isn’t always an unmitigated 
good. When macroeconomic condi-
tions change, the Fed presently has 
the flexibility to adjust course, regard-
less of any guiding rule, without 
worrying about triggering searing 
congressional scrutiny at precisely the 
time of monetary experimentation. 
A fixed rule, especially one report-
able to and subject to the oversight by 
Congress, could prevent the Fed from 
being able to quickly pivot in response 
to new information. The alternative is 
monetary policymaking by legislative 
committee, which is an institutional 
arrangement that independent central 
banks are precisely designed to correct. 
A second perennial proposal is 
a U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) annual audit of the 
Fed’s day-to-day monetary policy 
operations. Auditing the Fed enjoys 
a storied, bipartisan history, but it is 
important to distinguish an account-
ing audit from a political one.8 Today, 
the Federal Reserve undergoes a thor-
ough accounting audit each year, con-
ducted by a leading accounting firm 
with topline results disclosed to the 
public.9 It is also audited by the GAO 
in other ways, and has an independent 
Inspector General that conducts audits 
and investigations of various activities. 
Congress has also mandated one-time 
audits of specific activities, as it did 
in Dodd-Frank in auditing the Fed’s 
emergency lending program. 
That leaves the question: what 
is left for the GAO to audit? The 
answer is the Fed’s internal monetary 
policy deliberations, especially where 
those decisions are controversial. It is 
again understandable that members 
of Congress want to have a tighter 
grip on the way the Fed conducts 
itself: the Fed is, after all, a creature 
of Congress. But a GAO audit would 
only increase the level of organiza-
tional complexity within the Fed, 
already one of the most complex 
institutions of government. It would 
also be an easy bludgeon for members 
of Congress to litigate their preferred 
approach to monetary politics. Again, 
insulating the Fed from the day-to-
day of partisan politics is precisely the 
point of independent central bank-
ing. That insulation isn’t a complete 
removal—the Fed is still deeply 
embedded within the political system. 
But a GAO audit of monetary policy 
would remove almost all of that insu-
lation altogether. 
A third, newer proposal, subjects 
all financial regulatory agencies to 
the annual appropriations process. 
The Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau’s non-appropriated status has 
long been a source of contention, 
as discussed below, but the Federal 
Reserve has funded itself beyond 
appropriations since its founding in 
1913. The current proposal would 
exclude the Fed’s monetary policy 
operations and focus solely on its 
regulatory and financial supervisory 
activities. In principle, there is justi-
fication for this proposal, given how 
important the appropriations process 
is to congressional oversight of the 
administrative state and how much 
financial regulators have existed out-
side of that process (in addition to the 
CFPB and the Fed, the Comptroller 
of the Currency, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, and some 
other financial regulators are also not 
subject to the appropriations process). 
The proposal’s defining weak-
ness, though, is that appropriations 
oversight is a blunt tool not easily 
separated among functions. If it is true 
that the Fed should have budgetary 
independence for the conduct of mon-
etary policy, then subjecting it to the 
appropriations process for regulatory 
matters will only invite congressional 
meddling into anything the Fed does 
that is of political interest to members 
of Congress. In practice, there may be 
no meaningful way to separate super-
visory and regulatory activity from 
monetary policymaking. 
OVERHAULING THE CFPB
The Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau began its life as a policy 
proposal by then-Professor Elizabeth 
Warren, published in Democracy 
magazine in 2007. Interestingly, the 
“Financial Product Safety Com-
mission” that Warren first proposed 
(or the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Agency originally proposed in 
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the Frank version of the statute that 
became Dodd-Frank) looks very little 
like the final Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau created by the final 
statute. The differences are at the heart 
of what makes the CFPB so contro-
versial today. These differences have 
little to do with functions and every-
thing to do with structure. Function-
ally, the CFPB today is very much in 
line with what Warren, now a Demo-
cratic Senator from Massachusetts, 
proposed —the CFPB seeks to protect 
consumers from financial fraud and 
educate them about financial products 
like mortgages, credit cards, and stu-
dent loans. But structurally, the deci-
sion to render the new governmental 
agency a sub-bureau of the Federal 
Reserve headed by a single individual 
was not a Democratic idea, but a 
Republican one. Senator Bob Corker 
(R-TN) was a key figure in negotiat-
ing the Senate version of the bill and 
changing the structural features of the 
CFPB not to insulate it from politi-
cal oversight, but to quiet conservative 
fears about more and more bureau-
cracy interfering with market activity. 
The model for the CFPB was the Fed, 
not the SEC. 
Republican enthusiasm for that 
different structure didn’t even last 
through the legislative session that 
created it. The latest proposals would 
effectively abolish the CFPB and 
replace it with a regulatory commis-
sion called the “Consumer Financial 
Opportunity Commission,” given the 
dual mandate to enforce consumer 
financial protection laws (though 
with significantly limited tools for 
doing so) while enhancing “finan-
cial opportunity” for individuals and 
businesses, including banks. It would 
also be subject to the congressional 
appropriations process (it is currently 
funded through the Fed), be required 
to conduct cost-benefit analyses for 
all its regulations, and lose much of its 
enforcement authority. For example, 
it would have to consider the safety 
and soundness of financial institutions 
when promulgating new rules.10 States 
and tribes would be allowed to request 
unconditional waivers from CFPB 
regulations governing short-term, 
small-dollar credit (i.e., payday loans). 
And the Commission also would no 
longer have the authority to ban prod-
ucts or services it deems abusive. 
The curious redesign of the CFPB 
prompts the question: why not just 
abolish the agency altogether? The 
answer probably has more to do with 
the optics of that kind of abolition 
rather than policy preference. Given 
that House Republicans fear the back-
lash for being seen on the wrong side 
of consumers, abolishing the Bureau 
is not politically feasible, leaving an 
overhaul of its organizational struc-
ture and elimination of much of its 
functional authority as the only way to 
accomplish those same ends. 
The debate the Republicans seek 
to have is a worthy one. Should the 
CFPB look more like the SEC, less 
like the Fed? Should the United States 
have a CFPB at all? Certainly its bud-
getary autonomy protects it from con-
gressional oversight in a way that most 
agencies don’t enjoy. (See Figure 1 for 
how the CFPB’s budget per employee 
compares to the Fed and SEC.) But 
that debate should be clear on its 
terms. Restructuring the CFPB as an 
ambiguously charged independent 
commission would produce precisely 
the kind of bureaucratic muddle that 
Senate Republicans sought to avoid 
by making the CFPB an independent 
bureau of the Fed in the first place. 
If the Republicans want to elimi-
nate the Bureau on the charge that it 
has overstepped its bounds and that 
consumer financial protection regula-
tions hurt consumers more than they 
protect them, then that merits debate. 
Deregulation through reregulation 
is an inefficient, opaque, and confus-
ing mechanism for accomplishing the 
same goal. 
Journalists have tried, in vain, to 
get a commitment from the Trump 
Administration on the CFPB’s future. 
Of all the various aspects of financial 
reform, the identity and future of the 
CFPB will probably be the most con-
tested fight of the upcoming debate. 
RETHINKING SIFI 
DESIGNATION AND 
REGULATION
The third debate, already underway 
and likely to continue, relates to the 
way the federal government regulates 
the nation’s largest banks. The Dodd-
Frank Act created the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) 
to designate bank and non-bank 
financial companies as SIFIs and thus 
subject to greater regulatory burdens 
meant to prevent their failure. This is 
the first order of business for Dodd-
Frank, appropriately located in the 
Act’s Title I. The CHOICE Act, and 
likely any future incarnation, would 
repeal most of this authority.11 
Under the proposed legislation, the 
FSOC’s authority to break up large 
financial institutions upon the recom-
mendation of the Federal Reserve 
would disappear. The Council’s 
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research support arm – the Office of 
Financial Research – would be elimi-
nated. Additionally, the FSOC would 
no longer be able to designate non-
banks as SIFIs, and all of its previous 
designations of non-bank financial 
companies (e.g., AIG, Prudential, and 
MetLife) would be invalidated. This 
includes clearinghouses for derivatives 
– one of the very few aspects that both 
Republicans and Democrats lauded 
in the 2010 law. And even those large 
banks that Republicans agree could 
threaten the stability of the financial 
system could make a few changes 
to their capital structures and avoid 
most of the regulatory framework that 
Dodd-Frank created. 
If Republicans have shown 
discomfort with Title I, they have 
wholesale disregard for Title II. Title 
II recognizes that the regulatory 
efforts to prevent the largest banks 
from failure will not always work and 
provides a second, regulator-focused 
process whereby the largest banks are 
resolved through an “orderly liquida-
tion” rather than either a messy bailout 
or a catastrophic bankruptcy. Reflect-
ing a strong Republican consensus, the 
CHOICE Act eliminates all of Title 
II and replaces it with an addition to 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. When crit-
ics have said they hope to repeal the 
Dodd-Frank Act, they are sometimes 
speaking of precisely this proposal. 
Some of the ablest experts on 
Dodd-Frank view Title II as creating 
an institutional framework that will 
effectively guarantee further 2008-
style government interventions in 
market processes. But it is not at all 
obvious that so-called Article I judges 
are a superior approach. Bankruptcy 
judges are not experts in banking, and 
may be too inclined to treat bank debt 
as they would any other corporate 
reorganization. There may be benefits 
to letting Dodd-Frank test its mettle 
before handing over all liquidation 
authority to courts.
CONCLUSION
The Republican vision of financial 
regulatory relief over the last six years 
has been focused on limiting the 
executive’s discretion in response to 
financial risk. Purists will continue 
to lobby for these limits regardless 
of who holds the office of President, 
viewing ample executive discretion 
as the core problem to be corrected. 
Political strategists, however, who 
awoke in a Republican-controlled 
Washington, DC, may start reevalu-
ating their priorities. Now that a 
Republican is President, the great 
unknown for the future of finan-
cial reform is whether an insulated 
CFPB with a Trump appointee at its 
helm is the surest way to effectuate 
Republican policy goals, or whether a 
Trump-dominated Fed is superior to 
a rule-bound central bank more likely 
to interfere with Republican fiscal 
priorities, or a regulatory apparatus 
dominated by sympathetic personnel is 
indeed preferable to a system with less 
of that kind of partisan control. And, 
of course, much of the outcome on 
these policies will be driven by Trump 
himself. The White House is divided 
between those, like the Secretary of 
the Treasury-designate, who are old 
hands on Wall Street and those who 
reflect more of a populist suspicion 
of that very authority. It is on three 
key issues – the Fed’s role as a central 
bank and financial regulator insulated 
from Congressional oversight and the 
appropriations process; the CFPB’s 
governance structure and broad 
authority; and the designation and 
regulation of SIFIs – that the most 
important piece of financial legisla-
tion in decades, the Dodd-Frank Act, 
will be affirmed, amended, or rejected. 
Each path has enormous ramifications 
for the health and stability of the U.S. 
financial system.
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FIGURE 1 ANNUAL BUDGET PER EMPLOYEE (IN THOUSANDS) FOR SELECTED 
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